Rails, Jetty and Spring read the Forwarded header by default, letting clients spoof IP and host
Lauri Koskela has published, in a blog post dated 5 November, a study of how web frameworks handle the Forwarded request header from RFC 7239, the standard meant to replace the X-Forwarded-For family. The finding is a mismatch between layers. Most reverse proxies, CDNs and middleware rewrite the X-Forwarded headers but do not touch Forwarded, so a value a client puts in that header reaches the application unchanged, and several frameworks prefer it.
He built small echo applications and sent combinations of headers. Rails 8.1.3, Jetty 12.1.7 and Spring Boot 4.0.5 in several configurations, including on Jetty and Reactor Netty, all gave Forwarded priority over the X-Forwarded values written by the proxy. The result is spoofing of the client IP and, outside Rails, of the host name and protocol, which can bypass IP allow lists and rate limits or poison password-reset links. The usual defence, a list of trusted proxies, does not help here, because the request does come from a trusted proxy that simply passed the header along.
Rails picked up the behaviour by accident in 8.1, when its RemoteIp middleware began taking the client address from Rack, which reads Forwarded. After his report Rails extended its spoofing check to all three headers in 8.1.4.1. Spring Framework 7.1 and Spring Boot 4.2 now parse only X-Forwarded headers by default, Reactor Netty changed its configuration, and Jetty made the behaviour easier to configure without changing the default. Symfony requires each header to be enabled explicitly, and Express does not support Forwarded at all.

What it means
The fix is configuration, not code: make the proxy drop any forwarding header it does not set itself, and tell the application to read only the header the proxy writes. A trusted proxy that forwards untrusted input is the weak link the trusted-proxy list cannot see.